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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
As the government teeters 
Vladimir Putin's presidency has differed in many ways from Yel'tsin's regime; one 
of the most notable absences had been the constant flux in government and 
Kremlin personnel.  This year, however, Putin seems to be tilting toward a shake-
up in the government.  Or is it possible that he has discovered that Yel'tsin's 
trademark volatility in personnel decisions actually served several important aims 
in bureaucratic management?  It helped balance factions, playing them off 
against each other in a constant low-grade struggle. Also, uncertainty in office 
was a check on most (!) officials since the threat of ouster and replacement 
dampens long-term corruption schemes (it is notable that some apparatchiki take 
what they can get while in office, but here the threat of a possible audit by the 
new regime was wielded on one or two occasions). Finally of course, reshuffles 
permit the shifting of responsibility for intractable problems away from the 
Kremlin.  
 
The creation of the Public Chamber, and the tasking of the Chamber to deal with 
"National Priority Projects," also seemed to represent another step into a familiar 
pattern of duplication of authorities between the Government and the Kremlin.  At 
President Putin's recent press conference, a Rossiyskaya gazeta correspondent 
addressed the issue of duplication directly:   "Why has such a strange 
mechanism been created to work on these (national priority) projects when we 
already have a functioning parliament and government?" (1)  Putin's answer 
could scarcely comfort the Prime Minister:  "The Prime Minister heads the 
government of the Russian Federation and is responsible for overseeing 
everything that happens…. However, there were justified reasons, in my view, for 
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creating an additional mechanism…. These reasons are namely that we want to 
avoid the kinds of mistakes that have already been talked about here, the 
misappropriation of the funds allocated for these projects—and this is a huge 
amount…." (2) 
 
Is that a not-so-polite way of saying that Fradkov is in charge, but he and his 
ministerial friends are so corrupt and inept that they can't be counted on to 
implement the business of the country?  
 
In addition to the public backhand at the press conference, Prime Minister 
Fradkov had another rude surprise when Putin invited his one-time rival and 
resurgent foreign policy rudder, Yevgeni Primakov, to comment on the work of 
the government.  At a meeting ostensibly slated to discuss the work of the 
Primakov-led Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Putin was informed about the 
Chamber's excellent work in fostering cooperation with Arab states" "We are 
cooperating with all Arab world countries," Primakov beamed.  (3)  He also 
enthused that the Chamber was working "effectively" and "properly" across all of 
Russian territory. (4) 
 
When asked by the president about his experience working with the Prime 
Minister, specifically on the issue of food distribution for the military, Primakov let 
loose:  "The progress is poor." (…) "Russia has 173 territorial chambers of 
commerce and industry today.  They all may [sic] control the food of the army.  
But this business plan has stalled because of Fradkov's government." (5) 
 
Primakov's remarks appear not to have startled the president.  Perhaps Primakov 
(and possibly Putin) decided to wade into the current dispute between the 
Defense/First Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, and the Prime Minister. 
(Please see "RF Armed Forces: Internal Affairs" below for more on this dispute.)  
Perhaps it is another signal to Fradkov that his government's days are numbered.  
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Stoking the rumor mill's flames is the question of Fradkov's health.  The Prime 
Minister reportedly missed two weeks of work (and one meeting, which was 
chaired in his absence by Dmitri Medvedev) for either a cold or diabetes-related 
problems. (6) While some analyses tie the possible dismissal of the government 
to the search for a successor to Putin, it seems far more likely that the issue of a 
successor falls further down Putin's list of priorities (if not the lists of his friends 
and deputies), and that the move is contemplated to deal with possible crises, 
such as the possibility of another terrorist attack, or a mid-term issue as 
mundane as a potential decrease in oil revenues.  It is interesting, however, that 
criticism of the government seems to be focusing on military issues and regional 
questions.  The topics suggest the source of the complaints and may point to 
perceptions about "heirs apparent."  
 
In his own words: Putin and free speech 
In his January press conference, President Putin was asked about a stain on a 
community perpetrated by a newspaper report.  "A word is not a sparrow," the 
questioner cautioned.  President Putin's response, meant, no doubt, to comfort 
the correspondent, riffed on the sparrow metaphor: "As to the saying a word is 
not a sparrow, Zoshchenko said that a word is not a sparrow—once it flies out 
you cannot catch it.  But in Russia, we chase them, catch up with them and put 
them in prison." (7)  
 
Putin had more blunt, if not more threatening, comments for those who 
questioned Russia's status, particularly in foreign affairs.  Interestingly, the 
questioner asked what foreign press Putin read, but Putin responded with a 
sweeping denunciation of his foreign critics, "die-hard Sovietologists…who do not 
understand what is happening in our country and do not understand the changing 
world."  "There is not even any sense in entering into discussion with them….  
They really deserve no more than a ’Bah! Be off with you,’ and that's that." (8)  I 
guess that would be a "no" to a subscription to The ISCIP Analyst? 
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2005 Roundup: Putin decrees FSB personnel restructuring 
President Putin has made official adjustments to his decree on the structure of 
the Federal Security Services.  The Director of the FSB will now have two first 
deputies, one of whom will have specific oversight of the Border Guard Troops. 
(For more on the Border Guards, please see "Security Services" below.)  The 
Director also will have three deputies and a state secretary.  The previous 
structure of the FSB upper echelons would have been set by a decree of the 
president, following the proposals of the Kozak administrative reforms, which 
specifically abolished the positions of first deputies throughout the government. 
(9) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Transcript of the Press Conference of the Russian and Foreign Media, 31 Jan 
06 via www.kremlin.ru. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) "Primakov tells Putin about CCI work with foreign partners," Itar-Tass, 6 Feb 
06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) "Putin asks to accelerate administrative reform," SKRIN Market & Corporate 
News, 8 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) "A False Start for the Prime Minister's Dismissal," Izvestiya, 15 Feb 06; What 
the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Transcript, Ibid. 
(8) Transcript, Ibid. 
(9) Interfax, 2 Dec 05; FBIS Translated Text via WNC. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By John Kafer 
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Border Guard Troops 
Last fall, Russian Border Guards transferred control of the Tajikistan/Afghanistan 
border to Tajik control, representing a reduction in the presence of Russian 
Border Guards outside of Russia’s borders.  The Border Guard Service, 
organized under the Federal Security Service (FSB), is charged to protect 
Russia’s borders and administer the ports of entry, but those boundaries 
changed substantially after the breakup of the Soviet Union, eventually drawing 
most border troops back to the new Russian borders.  While border troops clearly 
remain active in certain CIS countries, including some that do not share borders 
with Russia, the extent of their activity remains largely unknown.  Meanwhile, the 
number of Border Guard troops continues to increase and Russia substantially 
increased their funding for 2006. 
  
Border Guard activity outside of Russia 
Following the Tajikistan civil war, Russia and Tajik authorities agreed to transfer 
control of the Tajik border from Russian to Tajik border troops.  The original 
agreement projected the complete withdrawal of Russian troops by early 2005, 
later postponed to begin in August, perhaps extending into 2006. (1)  Unlike 
planned military withdrawals in several other CIS states, which were often 
substantially delayed, Russia formally transferred control of the 
Tajikistan/Afghanistan border to Tajik border troops on October 19, 2005, largely 
adhering to the original timeline.  At Tajikistan’s request, Russia will maintain only 
a small contingent of senior Border Guard advisors in Tajikistan. (2)  
  
Russia continues to emphasize security coordination and information sharing 
with neighbor states, including Russian leadership of the formal Council of the 
Leaders of CIS Security Organs and Special Services (SORB).  While the 
footprint of Russian Border Guard troops on foreign soil has diminished over the 
years (the mission to patrol and protect Russia’s borders would not seem to 
require any border troops outside of Russia), they have gone beyond the 
framework of coordination and cooperation to maintain a presence in several 
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countries.  For example, officials in Armenia’s National Security Service claim 
they are grateful for the assistance of Russian Border Guards who patrol over 
400 km of Armenia’s border with Iran and Turkey. (3)  In a recent interview, FSB 
Director, Nikolai Patrushev stated “In our cooperation with Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan we take into account Russian border 
guards' presence on the territory of these states.” (4)  He did not elaborate on 
what they are doing in those states, three of which do not share a border with 
Russia.     
  
Moscow funds plan to improve borders 
While Russia has drawn border troops back from several CIS states, someone 
has a plan for them; they have grown from an estimated 140,000 troops three 
years ago to their current size of an estimated 160,000 and received a 
substantial budget increase. (5)  A September 2005 report announced that the 
Duma would approve a 30% increase to the Border Guard Service budget to a 
total of over R45 billion. (6)  While one certainly can expect Russia to spend a 
large amount of money protecting its borders (the country has the longest 
borders in the world), the size of the increase indicates a definite plan to improve 
the financing of the Border Guard Service at a pace substantially greater than the 
other security services or the military.  
  
A consistent message from senior Russian officials emphasizes their efforts to 
improve border fortifications, particularly in the North Caucasus.  Last May, 
Army-General Vladimir Pronichev, head of the Border Guard Service, outlined a 
future development program for which R15 billion, allocated over two years, is 
earmarked to improve border fortifications, primarily along the Russian-Georgian 
border.  The program includes building 1,341 facilities to support three areas of 
development: improving border guards’ living conditions, installing space 
communications systems to enable transmission of a real-time “picture” to the 
FSB headquarters in Moscow, and installing video and radar surveillance 
systems. (7)  
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The September budget announcements indicated support for the program.  Lt-
Gen Viktor Trufanov, deputy head of the Border Guard Service, stated that the 
2006 budget included R6.2 billion for border protection and fortification, a four-
fold increase from 2005.  He confirmed the money was part of the five-year 
Russia State Border program to build over 1,300 installations throughout the 
North Caucasus and along the Russian-Kazakh border. (8)  A later budget 
announcement stated that R1.6 billion from the 2006 budget increase would be 
spent on switching to a contract system of recruitment. (9)  It appears that these 
two areas of improvement, contract soldiers and border installations, account for 
nearly all of the 30% funding increase; the remainder of the budget increase 
accounts for a mere six percent.  
  
More recent announcements indicate that officials intend to follow through with 
the plan.  In a January interview, Colonel General Mansur Valiyev, Senior Deputy 
Director of the Border Guard Service, acknowledged the five-year plan to 
construct border facilities including modern visual and technical controls.  He also 
highlighted the fact that over 250 of 600 border guard vessels (ships, boats and 
tenders) are beyond modernization and must be replaced. (10)  President Putin, 
during a recent speech to the board of the FSB, commended the border troops 
for their work implementing the “Russia’s State Border” program, particularly in 
the North Caucasus. (11) 
  
Will plans survive military reorganization?  
Reports of efforts to reform Russia’s military agencies are proliferating once 
again.  The aggregate strength of armed forces within the Interior Ministry (MVD), 
the Emergencies Ministry, and the FSB (primarily border troops) is comparable to 
the Armed Forces in the Ministry of Defense.  The parallel structures often result 
in duplication of resources, manpower, and loss of efficiency.  President Putin 
recently attacked the current establishment for its redundancy and inefficient 
spending.  Once again, proposals are surfacing to unite the various armed forces 
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within the security ministries. (12)  A less comprehensive proposal to use the 
Armed Forces increasingly in security and law enforcement roles, would transfer 
some border guard troops (as well as MVD) to the Armed Forces.  So far, the 
Border Guard Service appears to have developed a longer-term and a short-
range strategic plan for improvement.  If the reorganization rumors come to pass, 
the new bureaucracy created, along with its new priorities, could jeopardize the 
vision established for the Border Guard Service.  
  
Russia has been trying to reorganize its military establishment since shortly after 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, but the security structure remains essentially the 
same.  Although some reorganization may occur within each of the security 
apparatuses, there are too many influential stakeholders among the power 
ministries to make major reform likely.  Additionally, reducing the flow of terrorists 
in the North Caucasus will remain a priority.  Therefore, fueled by the increase in 
petrol dollars, the Border Guard Service will likely follow through on efforts to 
build more border fortifications and improve border security.  
  
In our last issue, an incident in Blagoveshchenks, in the Republic of 
Bashkortostan was misidentified as occurring in Blagoveshchensk in the Far 
Eastern District. 
  
Source Notes: 
 
(1) The ISCIP Analyst (formerly the NIS Observed: An Analytical Review), Vol IX, 
Number 12, 15 Jul 04.  
(2) “Tajik President Hails Russia’s Role in Maintaining Regional Security,” BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, 21 Oct 05 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) “Armenia Commander on Cooperation with Russia Border Guards,” ITAR-
TASS, 4 Mar 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(4) “Partnership for Security. FSB Strengthening Ties With Foreign Counterparts” 
FSB Director Patrushev Interview by Timofey Borisov, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 
Jan 06, OSC Translated Text via WNC.  
(5) The Military Balance 2005-2006, International Institute for Statistical Studies 
(Routledge, Taylor, and Francis Group, London, UK), Oct 05. 
(6) “The Budget of the Border Guard Service Will Increase,” Krasnaya zveszda, 
22 Sep 05; What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging Markets.  
(7) “Russia Border Guard Chief Outlines Future Development Plans,” ITAR-
TASS, 27 May 05, FBIS Translated Text via WNC.  
(8) “Russia to Increase Border Financing Fourfold in 2006,” BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, 2 Sep 05; via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) Ibid, Krasnaya zveszda.  
(10) “Border Service Switches to Contracts” by Boris Dmitriyev, Voyenno-
promyshlenny kurier, No 49, 28 Dec 05 – 10 Jan 06; WPS via Lexis-Nexis.  
(11) Speech at a Meeting of the Board of the FSB, Kremlin.ru, 7 Feb 06 via JRL 
2006 #37.  
(12) “The End of Collective Armies” by Alexi Alexandrov, Rossiiskie vesti, No. 39, 
3 Nov 05; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Marisa Payne 
 
Russia’s rendezvous with rogue regimes. 
Since President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, Russia has sought to 
create diplomatic influence with so-called rogue states around the world. Lately, 
Russia has established itself successfully as a key player in the controversy 
surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While Russia officially has strayed little 
from the common IAEA line, including agreements to allow the IAEA to report 
Iran’s recalcitrance to the United Nations Security Council, Russia’s insistence on 
waiting until March for any action actually has provided Iran with precious time to 
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continue on its path to acquire nuclear weapons – an outcome that IAEA was set 
up to avoid. Now, Russia is hoping to become a decisive force by becoming a 
conduit through which the United States and Europe can communicate with the 
newly-elected Hamas leadership in the Palestinian territories. 
 
As one-fourth of the Middle East Quartet, which also includes the United States, 
the European Union and the United Nations, Russia officially has established 
itself as one of the major powers that seeks to influence policy in that region. 
Since 2003, Russia has aligned itself with the policies of the Middle East 
Quartet’s “Road Map,” which calls for a peaceful two-state solution between 
Israel and Palestine. Sergei Lavrov continued to promulgate the official Quartet 
line in a February 7 statement, stating that Russia “is hoping for the formation of 
a viable Palestinian government which will reaffirm Israel’s right to exist.” (1) On 
the same day, President Vladimir Putin stated, during a press conference in 
Spain, that although Hamas is viewed as a terrorist organization by the other 
nations and institutions in the Quartet, it would be a mistake to impose sanctions 
on the Palestinian Authority. He continued, “I have certain ideas about what we 
can do and how we can go about [establishing a peaceful Middle East].” (2) 
 
Two days later, Putin’s “certain ideas” were revealed to the chagrin of the 
remaining members of the Quartet. On February 9, Russian officials extended an 
open invitation to Hamas leaders asking them to come to Moscow for diplomatic 
talks. Aleksandr Kalugin, Russia’s special envoy to the Middle East, was quoted 
by Russia’s Interfax news agency, “What we want is for [Hamas] to respect 
previous agreements and that there should be no terrorist acts…And, of course, 
they must move towards the recognition of Israel’s right to exist.” (3) Israeli 
cabinet member Meir Sheetrit explained his country’s perceived betrayal by 
accusing Putin of “stabbing Israel in the back,” adding, “I wonder what Putin 
would say if we invited the Chechens here and talked to them.” (4)  
 
 11 
Only a few weeks earlier, Russia had been a cosignatory of the quartet demand 
that dealing with Hamas be contingent on that organization renouncing terrorism, 
disbanding its armed network + recognizing Israel’s right to exist–demands that 
Hamas has rejected explicitly since the Palestinian elections. While it is possible 
that Russian officials may believe they can convince Hamas to accept the 
existence of Israel and become partners in the peace process, it is more 
plausible that Russia is using its leverage to assert itself, once again, as a viable 
world player. A researcher at the Carnegie Endowment’s Moscow office, Aleksei 
Arbatov, voiced the latter view: “Russia wants to win global clout by acting as a 
mediator amid growing tensions between the West and the Islamic world.” (5) 
Arbatov pointed out that many researchers are beginning to see parallels 
between Russian policy in the Middle East now and former Soviet Middle East 
policy: “The Soviet Union was engaged in Mideast games for decades and got 
nothing in return. It’s useless to get involved in that again. It may bring some 
tactical benefits, but incur big strategic damage.” (6) 
 
Russia is performing a dangerous balancing act on a shaky wire. Russia is using 
its leverage with Iran and the Palestinian Authority to ensure their status on the 
world scene, and not necessarily for altruistic motives. Putin fancies himself as 
the link between East and West, but, in reality his policies could make him a 
vulnerable target from all sides. His policy toward Iran has given the Iranians 
precious time to pursue a nuclear arsenal; his recent arms deal with Iran to 
provide that country with a fleet of missiles, has given the country the capabilities 
needed to defend a nuclear weapons cache (7); and, his goal to engage Hamas 
has startled and may alienate many of the very countries Russia hopes to 
impress. 
 
Russian reasoning behind their actions regarding Iran and Hamas is perplexing. 
It seems unlikely that Russia does not realize it is allowing and even helping Iran 
acquire nuclear weapons. Questions abound: Why would Russia want these 
weapons to sit just on the other side of Georgia – a country over which Russia 
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would like to hold the only real influence? Why would Russia risk alienating itself 
from the leading powers of the world to legitimize an organization that has been 
declared a terrorist institution by much of the world? (?  especially in light of one 
of Putin’s latest statements on terrorism: “No civilized nation can allow itself the 
luxury of negotiating with terrorists because negotiations with terrorist only 
weaken the state and strengthen the terrorists.”) (8) 
 
Hamas has expressed a desire to establish relations with “Islamic,” “Arab,” and 
“communist” countries, but has not specifically answered whether those 
categories include Russia. (9). Either way, Russia is not likely to possess any 
real negotiating power regarding the policies Hamas chooses to pursue, 
especially as long as Russia aligns itself with the Quartet. 
 
Likewise, Russia does not seem to be asserting any real power over Iranian 
nuclear ambitions. Russia offers enrichment deals and trying to bargain, but 
leaves it up to the Iranians whether they wish to accept the terms. If they do not 
perceive the Russian deals as beneficial to their nuclear programs, there is no 
real incentive held out for Iran to accept a deal. Konstantin Kosachev, a member 
of the lower parliament who is said to be “Kremlin-connected” stresses Russia’s 
supposed weakness toward Iran, claiming that Russia has “practically no levers 
to put pressure on Iran.” (10) 
 
Iranian officials confirmed Russia’s supposed lack of influence in the region by 
indefinitely postponing talks that were supposed to occur on February 16. (11) 
 
Muhammad cartoon conspiracy? 
In the wake of the “spy rock” scandal that accused four British diplomats of 
spying by means of a computer-equipped mock rock in a park, Russia’s Federal 
Security Service (FSB) has surfaced once again in the news regarding a new, 
even more ridiculous conspiracy. However, this time, instead of the FSB 
accusing British diplomats, a former FSB lieutenant colonel, who now lives in 
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London, has accused his former FSB colleagues of planting in a Danish 
newspaper the infamous Muhammad cartoons, which have sparked extremist 
violence around the globe. 
 
Ekho Moskvy reported that Aleksandr Litvinenko revealed that a culture editor, 
Fleming Rose, of the Danish paper that ran the cartoons was working in 
conjunction with the FSB: “I have data that this individual [Rose] has direct links 
to Russian special services, the FSB. He is married to a Russia woman. His 
wife’s father is a KGB general. This man was the first or among the first to have 
written in Denmark that Akhmed Sakayev killed a priest, father Filip, who 
subsequently turned out to be alive. When I looked at these materials, I put two 
and two together and was left in no doubt at all that it is Russian special services 
which are behind this whole provocation.” (12) 
 
Rose denied any involvement with the FSB or KGB and has apologized to the 
Muslim community for his involvement in publishing the cartoons. (13) 
 
At the time of press, Russia had not addressed Litvinenko’s accusations, but 
Russian President Vladimir Putin did condemn the publication of the cartoons 
while addressing journalists in a February 7 press conference during his state 
visit to Spain. While he strongly criticized the creation and publication of the 
cartoons (he compared them to child pornography and devoted some five 
sentences to that condemnation), he only devoted one sentence to criticism of 
the extremist violent reactions: “[E]xtremist manifestations are very dangerous 
from any quarters and we very much hope that Muslim religious leaders and the 
leaders of the Muslim world will be able to bring this situation under control.” (14)  
 
While not at all corroborating Litvinenko’s conspiracy theory, which seems to say 
more about the shady connections between the Soviet-era KGB and today’s FSB 
than anything else, Putin’s clearly light chiding of the extremist reactions versus 
his sharp condemnation of the publication of the cartoons does illuminate 
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Russia’s current policy line regarding the Middle East: Putin is trying to appease 
the East and the West. The real question is: how long before that policy – and 
not a silly conspiracy – leads to a volatile eruption? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Russia’s Lavrov hopes Palestinians will accept Israel’s right to exist,” BBC 
Monitoring, 7 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Transcript of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via 
president.kremlin.ru. 
(3) “Russia-Hamas talks anger Israel,” BBC News, 9 Feb 06, via 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4701312.stm. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) “Russia seeks to expand its global clout by reaching out to rogue regimes,” 10 
Feb 06, AP Worldstream via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) “Foreign Relations,” 8 Dec 05, ISCIP Analyst via 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol11/ed1104.html#foreign. 
(8) Transcript of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via 
president.kremlin.ru. 
(9) “Russia-Hamas talks anger Israel,” 9 Feb 06, BBC News via 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4701312.stm. 
(10) “Russia walking fine line in Iran nuclear standoff,” 8 Feb 06, Prime-Tass via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) “Iran Moves Forward on Atomic Production,” 13 Feb 06, New York Times via 
nytimes.com. 
(12) “Former FSB man says Russian secret service behind cartoon row,” 7 Feb 
06, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) Transcript of “Interview to the Spanish Media,” 7 Feb 06 via 
president.kremlin.ru. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Spy rocks and NGO scandals – Vindication? 
In a fiasco that could have significant impact on Russian nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) that receive foreign funding, the Russian secret services 
(FSB) have accused members of the British embassy of espionage. The scandal 
centers around what has become known as the “spy rock,” a transmitting device 
disguised as a rock that supposedly received and dispatched intelligence 
information from its repository in a park in central Moscow. Of the four British 
embassy employees “implicated” in the scandal, one of them, Marc Doe, had 
substantial ties to Russian NGOs. Doe is the second secretary of the British 
embassy in Moscow and overseer of the Global Opportunities Fund, a section of 
Britain’s foreign office which dispenses money to NGOs. 
 
The espionage story broke on 22 January when Rossiya, the state-owned 
television channel, broadcast a show entitled “Spies.” The program centered on 
the “discovery” of the spy rock by the FSB and the alleged involvement of the 
British embassy. The second half of the show switched the focus to Britain’s ties 
with Russian NGOs, proportedly showing documents signed by embassy 
personnel and recording the receipt of money by NGOs. Among those implicated 
were the prominent human rights organization Moscow Helsinki Group and the 
Eurasia Foundation. 
 
The story follows closely on the heels of the passage of an unpopular law 
mandating stricter oversight of NGOs by the state. The law was protested by 
many Western governments, including the United Kingdom. The law was widely 
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interpreted as the Kremlin’s attempt to squelch the development of a Russian 
“Color Revolution,” such as those that occurred in Georgia and Ukraine. The 
“disclosure” that a spying British embassy employee played a key role in the 
disbursement of Western funds to Russian NGOs constitutes an attempt to justify 
the harsher NGO legislation.   
 
Pressing its advantage, the state has announced its appeal to the Moscow 
Basmanny District Court to close the Russian Human Rights Research Center on 
the grounds that it has not reregistered since 1999. (1)  The Center is the 
umbrella organization for 12 NGOs, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and 
the Union of Soldiers’ Mothers Committees. The two organizations have proved a 
thorn in the side of the Kremlin administration and its military apparatus on 
numerous occasions, most notably over the situation in Chechnya. In response, 
the Moscow Helsinki Group has announced its intention to sue state-owned 
Rossiya and Channel One as well as Gazprom-owned NTV over their broadcasts 
of the allegations that it is funded by the British secret services. Predictably, the 
group does not expect a favorable response. Its leader, Lyudmila Alekseyeva, 
said it was prepared to take its case to the European Court of Arbitration in the 
likely event of an unfavorable hearing in the Moscow Arbitration Court. (2) 
 
The Public Chamber, which met for the first time on 22 January, is also getting in 
on the action. It has asked Putin not use the “British Scandal” as an excuse for 
curbing civil society, but also has proposed special regulations for NGOs 
receiving state funding along the lines proposed by Putin in July 2005. (3) 
 
The irony of the situation is that, spy rocks aside, the British funding of NGOs 
was done in a completely legal and transparent manner. Unfortunately, now 
NGOs have been linked to foreign spies because of the broad media coverage. It 
will be difficult to recover the lost ground and the legitimacy needed to counter 
authoritarian controls over NGOs and civil society generally in light of the events 
of the last few weeks. 
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Hazing, Soldiers’ mothers and Private Sychev 
The recent disclosure of the case of Private Andrei Sychev has brought 
increasing attention to the well-known but intractable problem of hazing in the 
Russian military. Private Sychev was subjected to beating and torture by other 
servicemen, then left without medical treatment for three days while his condition 
worsened. His legs and genitals had to be amputated once he finally did receive 
medical care. Unfortunately, Sychev’s case is by no means unusual, although the 
response of military authorities is telling. Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, 
shunted questions about the case when he first learned of it from journalists, 
saying that if it had been a serious incident, he would have heard about it. (4)  
The official response changed soon after authorities realized that it was, indeed, 
a serious incident and as well as a public relations disaster. Putin promised 
money to cover Sychev’s hospital expenses and discussed the possible 
implementation of an earlier scheme to create a military police force. 
 
Hazing often goes unreported in the media or to upper military officials. Many of 
the cases that do come to light do so through the offices of the Union of Soldiers’ 
Mothers Committees, which have been campaigning against hazing in first the 
Soviet and then the successor Russian army since the latter portion of the Soviet 
Afghan War. This organization offers a valuable service in helping conscripts and 
their families deal with issues such as hazing, deferments, and even collection of 
state allotments for conscripts’ families if the soldier dies in action. The group is 
led by Valentina Melnikova. Neither of Melnikova’s two sons served in the army 
because she got involved with a group of soldiers’ mothers when her oldest son 
was up for the Soviet draft in 1989. She has been involved ever since. The 
soldiers’ mothers have proven remarkably effective in helping conscripts and 
their families negotiate interactions with the military. It has proven one of the 
relatively few Russian organizations to develop solid popular support. This 
effectiveness in challenging the state and in holding it accountable for its military 
actions are the driving factors behind the state’s attempts to shut the Union down 
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by closing its umbrella organization, the Russian Human Rights Research 
Center. 
 
The Sychev incident has encouraged other people to press charges against the 
military for various abuses including the renting of conscripts for slave labor in 
order to supplement the income of certain officers. (5) 
 
Still trying to define its mission, role, and actual ability to influence policy, the 
Public Chamber has become involved in the hazing fracas. Chamber members 
Anatoly Kucherena and Nikolai Svanidze traveled to Chelyabinsk to investigate 
the Sychev matter personally.  The Public Chamber’s commission for monitoring 
law enforcement and security organs has established a working group that will 
draft proposals on how to address the issue of hazing in the armed forces. The 
commission will include Valentina Melnikova and Ella Pamfilova, Secretary of the 
President’s Council for Developing Civil Society. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russian Authorities Aim to Close Human Rights Research Center,” 27 Jan 
06, Mayak Radio; FBIS transcribed text via World News Connection (WNC). 
(2) “Moscow Helsinki Group to sue Russian TV channels,” 31 Jan 06, Prime-
Tass English-language Business Newswire via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) “Public Chamber focuses on funding NGOs from the budget,” 8 Feb 06, 
Kommersant; Russian Press Digest via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) “Russian Non-state TV Highlights Pressure on Defence Minister over Bullying 
Case,” 1 Feb 06, BBC Monitoring International Reports via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) “Russian Officer Hired Out Troops for Slave Labour,” 3 Feb 06, The Guardian 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Marcel LeBlanc and Jeffrey Butler 
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INTERNAL 
Internal battles stifling defense industry 
Bureaucratic infighting and diffusion of institutional authority continue to hamper 
the effectiveness of Russia’s defense industry.  Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov 
and newly-appointed Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov waged one of the 
most recent battles.  Ivanov (the Defense Minister) added the title of Deputy 
Prime Minister in part to increase his ability to control defense industry as well as 
the Ministry of Defense.  Indeed, a week after his promotion in mid-November, 
Ivanov embarked on a tour of military enterprises across Russia with clear 
aspirations for assuming a leading role in the military industrial complex. (1)  
Along the tour Ivanov speculated that he would likely chair Russia’s military-
industrial commission which he stated is “one of the two main mechanisms for 
managing the defense sector.” (2)  Ivanov added, “I don't rule out the possibility 
that I might chair this commission, and I am well aware of the burden of 
responsibility that would rest on my shoulders, which are none too broad.” (3) 
 
However, Fradkov had other ideas, as he resisted yielding chairmanship of the 
commission and eventually won the right to maintain his symbolic position.  After 
a two-week delay, Fradkov signed the document detailing the distribution of 
power among the deputy prime ministers with the understanding that he would 
retain chairmanship of the military industrial commission. (4)  In addition, Fradkov 
announced his intention to retain control over distribution of funds in the defense 
industry.  Ivanov was given the role of deputy chair for the military-industrial 
committee and given a “coordinating responsibility” for the defense industry.  This 
was clearly not his first preference.  More importantly, this type of bureaucratic 
maneuver significantly diminishes hope for any improvement in the splintered 
distribution of authority for managing the defense industry. 
 
Fradkov also made clear his intention to preclude Ivanov and the defense 
ministry from establishing a new agency for managing the defense industry.  
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There is widespread speculation that a ministry for the defense industry will soon 
be re-created with presidential envoy Ilya Klebanov mentioned as the director, 
given his previous experience in a similar post. (5)  It also is expected that the 
new organization would be embedded in the ministry of defense.  However, 
Fradkov downplayed this speculation on his own personal tour of the defense 
establishment:  "As yet, there is no need to establish a separate agency; better 
coordination is a more immediate need." (6)  Fradkov instead suggested that 
time was needed to evaluate the current arrangement: “a deputy prime minister 
(also the defense minister) working with the prime minister who chairs the 
military-industrial complex commission." (7)  Hence, the battle lines already are 
drawn opposing a badly needed central authority for managing the defense 
industry. 
 
Beyond individual maneuvering, institutional pathologies also are hampering the 
likelihood of improving management of the defense industry.  Even within the 
defense ministry, competition between personalities and offices creates turmoil 
especially since there is no single leader to keep the various factions in line.  For 
example, plans to institute a single authority to manage defense contracts 
continues to suffer from a pitched battle between General Aleksei Moskovsky, 
Deputy Defense Minister for Armament, and Andrei Belyaninov, Director of the 
Federal Defense Order Service, which was created by Presidential Decree a 
year ago. (8)  Moskovsky’s and Belyaninov’s empires control nearly $35 billion 
annually, and there are also other fiefdoms within the MoD which wield 
substantial influence over defense industry funds. (9)  Other MoD oligarchs 
include Sergei Chemezov, director of Rosoboronexport, which handles 
approximately $7 billion per year primarily in Russia’s expanding export market 
as well as General Vladimir Isakov, deputy defense minister and chief of the 
Armed Forces Rear Services, who is in charge of billions of dollars in purchases 
made by the state's security-related agencies. (10)  It will be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, for Russia to improve its defense efficiency without breaking 
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down the artificial divisions of resources, and centralized planning, and instituting 
more accountability. 
 
Fradkov appears to have achieved his near-term goal of maintaining the 
chairmanship of the military-industrial commission, but storm clouds are on the 
horizon.  First, rumors of Fradkov’s departure are increasing in intensity, and his 
recent one week absence due to illness only serves to increase speculation that 
he will soon be replaced. (11)  Second, past reforms continue to fail and 
production has not improved.  As Belyaninov admitted, military spending has 
increased 30% in recent years with no discernable increase in production output. 
(12)  Finally, while Ivanov may not have the seat at the head of the table, he has 
direct access to Putin, which is far more valuable.  The best that Fradkov can 
hope for is to keep some semblance of relevancy by creating additional 
commissions; Ivanov’s connections give him far greater potential to effect real 
change…if Russia ever gets serious about improving defense industry 
performance.  The harsh truth for Russia’s defense industry is that the military 
industrial complex is not a driving issue in the 2008 election and its leaders are 
not serious about implementing needed changes. 
 
Export market continues to boom 
All the news for the defense industry is not bad, as military exports continue to 
rise.  Mikhail Dmitriyev, the head of the Federal Service for Military and Technical 
Cooperation, announced that Russia achieved a post-Soviet arms sales record of 
$6.1 billion in 2005. (13)  Moreover, Dmitriyev is also optimistic about the future 
as Russia has $23 billion in new weapons contracts already on the books: 
“These orders will be fulfilled starting in 2007, and our annual sales will exceed 
$7 billion starting in 2007."  (14)  India and China are the primary recipients of 
Russian hardware.  Vyacheslav Dzirkaln, deputy head of the Federal Military-
Technical Cooperation Service stated, "More than $7 billion worth of weapons 
and military hardware were sold to India in the last five years.  We are working on 
nearly $10 billion worth of new contracts with India nowadays." (15)  Russian 
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military exports to China continue to be strong particularly in the wake of last 
year’s Peace Mission 2005 joint military exercises. 
 
Russia also is beginning to diversify its customer base to maintain strong growth 
in the arms export business.  Indonesia and Malaysia have made large 
purchases and Vietnam has agreed to a billion dollar deal for Russian naval 
ships, missiles, and aircraft. (16)  In the Middle East, Russia plans to continue a 
billion dollar deal to sell twenty-nine Tor-M1 and Pechora-A2 air defense systems 
to Iran, despite international concern over Iran’s nuclear program.  Russia also 
continues to cultivate business in Syria.  (17)  In Latin America, demand for 
Russian arms continues to grow particularly in countries such Venezuela that 
have adversarial relationships with the US.  Venezuela recently purchased 
100,000 Kalashnikov rifles from Russia and is considering buying more AK-47s 
and perhaps even MiG fighters, much to the chagrin of the US. (18)  Russia is 
undeterred by the prospect of US disapproval on arms sales in Latin America.  
As Dmitriyev states, “If Venezuela wants to get MiGs, we are ready to 
cooperate.” (19) 
 
In Africa, Russia is poised to consummate the single largest post Soviet defense 
export deal with a $4 billion package of arms to Algeria.  The basic agreement 
has already been hammered out and is awaiting a planned visit by Putin in 
February or March.  The list of weapons includes Mig-29 and Su-30 fighter 
aircraft, S-300 air defense systems, and T-90 battle tanks along with additional 
maintenance and support contracts. (20)  If this sale proceeds as planned, 
Algeria could account for as much as 20 percent of Russia’s military exports in 
the near-future. (21) 
 
Furthermore, Russia is innovating to improve maintenance and servicing of its 
arms exports.  In the post-Soviet era, Russia’s indifference or inability to provide 
logistics and maintenance support to clients has been a significant liability, in 
contrast to Western arms dealers.  Russia appears to have re-discovered that 
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much of the profit in arms deals is in long-term support and is now planning to 
increase and upgrade its customer service operation.  Dmitriyev said that new or 
expanded weapons service centers are being considered worldwide and 
specifically mentioned Vietnam, China, Ethiopia, Jordan, Algeria, and Venezuela 
as possible sites. (22)  
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EXTERNAL 
Georgia and Russia: Approaching the boiling point 
Givi Targamadze, head of Georgia’s parliamentary Defense and Security 
Committee, had unusually strong words for Russia on 6 February when he 
threatened that Georgia would use force to expedite the removal of Russian 
“peacekeepers” from his country. (1)  Targamadze’s statements typified the 
rhetoric of what has been a particularly busy year for leaders in Georgia and 
Russia looking to affect the outcome of the conflicts in separatist Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.  As Georgia’s parliament formally prepares to debate the 
presence of Russian peacekeepers in the republics, Georgia has turned up its 
rhetoric on the issue.  Once again, while politicians on both sides of the debate 
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stoke the fires, Russian and Georgian troops find themselves in a simmering 
cauldron that threatens to boil over into armed conflict. 
 
Political rhetoric in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
Last October, the Georgian parliament may have planted the seeds for the 
current war of words when legislators set February 2006 and July 2006 deadlines 
to complete their evaluation of the effectiveness of Russian “peacekeepers” 
stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. (2)  Although it seems pre-determined 
that these evaluations would find Russian “peacekeepers” ineffective, tensions 
between Georgia and Russia have escalated as the politicians’ deadlines 
approached. 
 
Much of the rhetoric centers on South Ossetia.  On 10 January, officials from 
South Ossetia accused Georgia of deploying troops to the region in violation of 
existing agreements. (3)  Moreover, Russian Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov, 
commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Force in the conflict zone, charged 
Georgian politicians with “aggressive” statements that make the demilitarization 
of the region and disarmament of illegally armed groups there impossible. (4)  
These charges seem to offer Russia more excuse to claim that its peacekeepers 
cannot be asked to leave the area.   
 
In response to accusations leveled by Russia and South Ossetia, the Georgian 
Foreign Ministry has reiterated its long-held position that Russia illegally provides 
armament to South Ossetian forces. (5) This claim dovetails with Georgia’s more 
fundamental complaint that Russian “peacekeepers” do not fulfill their mandate of 
disbanding illegal armed formations, disarming “self-defense forces,” and 
preventing the concentration of heavy weaponry in the conflict zone. (6)  
Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili furthered his government’s position 
in a plea for support he made 25 January to the European Parliament’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee.  In his statements, Bezhuashvili argued that Russia is the 
chief impediment to a solution in the region. (7)  Although the EU likely will be 
 26 
slow to act on Bezhuashvili’s plea, Georgia appears to be building its case for 
any future steps it might take in South Ossetia. 
 
Matters are not much different in Abkhazia.  The day following Bezhuashvili’s 
remarks about Russia and the conflict in South Ossetia, Russia seemed to take a 
step back in its stated commitment to solving the conflict in Abkhazia.  
Specifically, during a 26 January meeting of the United Nations Security Council, 
Russia made clear it no longer supports the “Boden Paper” as a basis for 
negotiations on Abkhazia’s status within Georgia.  Although Abkhaz officials 
never before had accepted the document, crafted by German diplomat Dieter 
Boden, this was the first time Russian officials explicitly denied the document’s 
viability.  Furthermore, at the same meeting, Security Council members voted to 
extend the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) by only two 
months, far short of the six-month extension that heretofore had been the norm. 
(8)  Ending the UNOMIG early could prove convenient for parties that do not 
want international observers present in a conflict zone. 
 
Georgia’s Armed Forces 
The questioning of Georgia’s military status looms large in the issues at hand.  
Russian officials, along with those of Abkhaz and South Ossetian secessionists, 
have questioned Georgia’s recent military build-up. Perhaps they are alluding to 
the fact that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, on 5 January, signed into 
law plans to expand Georgia’s armed forces from 21,550 personnel to 31,878 
personnel, an increase of nearly 50%. (9)  Moreover, additional plans for 
changes in Georgia’s military seem consistent with Georgia’s intent to join NATO.  
On 3 February, Georgian President Saakashvili confirmed Georgia’s desires for 
military accession to NATO in a speech he made at the annual Munich 
international security conference, just one day after he signed a decree to end 
Georgia’s participation in the CIS Defense Council. (10)  Georgia’s three-pronged 
approach of increasing the size of its military, disengaging from CIS structures, 
setting Georgia on a course for NATO membership likely will produce a series of 
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repercussions, including the intensification of tension between its troops and 
those from Russia or the breakaway republics.  
 
Georgian forces increasingly seem positioned for confrontation with Russian 
troops. In a 3 February announcement, Georgian authorities voiced their 
suspicions that a Russian-made “Igla” surface-to-air missile discovered near 
South Ossetia was intended for use by South Ossetian terrorists who planned to 
assassinate President Saakashvili by shooting down his helicopter.  Furthermore, 
Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili stated that the missile could only 
have been “brought [to South Ossetia] from Russia through the help of 
Ossetians.” (11)  Givi Targamadze went further than Okruashvili and suggested 
that Russian forces could have tipped-off South Ossetian terrorists of 
Saakashvili’s travel plans. (12) Although the validity of Georgia’s claims has not 
been ascertained, they nonetheless seem well-timed to garner political leverage 
before the 15 February vote by Georgia’s parliament on whether to call for the 
withdrawal of Russian “peacekeepers” from South Ossetia.  
 
A vote calling for the withdrawal of Russian “peacekeepers” would not be 
surprising, nor would the call be unprecedented. Still, both sides seem primed for 
a confrontation. On 31 January fistfights reportedly broke out between Georgian 
police and Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia following the police officers’ 
attempts to tow the “peacekeepers’” military vehicle after an accident. 
Reportedly, the fights did not break-up until shots were fired – into the air. (13)  
More serious is the insinuation made on 26 January that Georgian police 
abducted and killed an Ossetian man in the village of Kekhvi. (14)  These 
allegations, made by the Foreign Ministry of the unrecognized Republic of South 
Ossetia, preceded claims by South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity that 
Georgia had deployed 500 servicemen to the republic in the hopes of provoking 
armed conflicts with Russian peacekeepers. (15) 
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Clashes in South Ossetia continue. On 9 February Georgia announced that its 
military police reportedly arrested three Russian “peacekeepers” in South 
Ossetia on charges of visa violations. (16) Reportedly, there was no violence in 
the arrests; nonetheless, the move undoubtedly exacerbated the risks of future 
conflict. In response to the arrests, Russian Major-General Marat Kulakhmetov 
claimed, “I believe this incident is yet another gross provocation carried out, once 
again, by units of the Georgian Defense Ministry.  At this stage, we’ve reinforced 
all our checkpoints and taken all steps so as to not allow any forceful incident to 
occur.” (17) 
 
More to come… 
Georgia’s parliament is scheduled to make a final decision on the presence of 
Russian “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia by 15 February. (18) A similar decision 
regarding Abkhazia is scheduled for July. (19) In both cases, it seems a given 
that Georgia’s lawmakers will rule against the presence of Russian troops in the 
regions.    The next step after such a vote would be for Georgia’s executive 
branch formally to demand that Russia withdraw all of its troops. If President 
Saakashvili’s government makes this oft-repeated demand, the difference from 
past experiences will be the political and military leverage Georgia and Russia 
have applied to each other in the months leading up to their inevitable 
confrontation. (For more on the situation in Georgia, please see the Caucasus 
Report, below). 
 
Military Lagniappe* 
In other Georgian military news, the head of Georgia’s National Guard abruptly 
resigned on 25 January after serving in his post for only 10 days. (20) The 
resignation of Lt-General Giorgi Tatukhashvili appears to be unrelated to 
Georgia’s recent spats with Russia over the presence of Russian “peacekeepers” 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  However, it seems likely Tatukhasvili was a 
casualty of an on-going political battle between President Saakashvili, who 
appointed Tatukhasvili, and the president’s Defense Minister, Irakli Okruashvili. 
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The Defense Minister, who in the past two years also has served as Georgia’s 
Prosecutor General and Interior Minister, reportedly appointed a successor for 
Tatukhashvili before Saakashvili could accept his resignation. 
 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has reiterated his government’s position 
that Russia will not withdraw its 1,500 peacekeeping troops from Moldova’s 
breakaway Transdniester republic.  Ivanov made this announcement just two 
days after Russian President Vladimir Putin lamented what he suggested was 
the unacceptable state of Russian-Moldovan relations. (22) 
 
*Lagniappe (‘lan – yap) n. something given or obtained gratuitously, something 
extra. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Kate Martin 
 
GEORGIA 
What will Tbilisi do? 
For months now, officials from Georgia, the breakaway region of South Ossetia 
and Russia have been ratcheting up the rhetoric.  And tensions have been 
increasing, to such an extent that few would have been surprised had armed 
 31 
conflict begun.  Indeed, war almost began last week between “peacekeeping” 
regiments. 
 
This week, the Georgian parliament is scheduled to discuss issuing a demand 
that Russian “peacekeepers” leave South Ossetia, based on the belief that the 
Joint Control Commission (JCC), a quadripartite group consisting of Georgia, 
Russia, South Ossetia and North Ossetia, has not managed to resolve the issue 
of South Ossetian demands for independence.  But how much weight would such 
a declaration have?  None, according to Russian and South Ossetian officials.  
“Peacekeepers will continue fulfilling their task anyway because the Georgian 
parliament’s decision means nothing for peacekeepers.  Firstly, we are 
subordinated to the control commission for settling the conflict.  Secondly, the 
decision to deploy peacekeepers was made by the Russian and Georgian 
presidents in 1992,” claimed Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Russian 
peacekeeping contingent. He warned in a decidedly non-peacekeeping tone that 
“Georgian military or police units sent to the conflict zone will turn into cannon 
fodder.” (1) 
 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and his ministers have been laying the 
groundwork for increased hostilities and/or a change of peacekeeping authority in 
the conflict region.  Saakashvili has sought an alternative framework to the 
conflict resolution, arguing that the JCC is ineffective and obstructionist. (2) And 
Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli continues to carry that banner, charging Russia 
with “the stalling of the peace process.” (3) 
 
Recent actions are beginning to speak almost as loud as the words.   Reportedly 
in response to a traffic accident in Abkhazia involving a vehicle driven by a 
Georgian citizen and a Russian army vehicle, hundreds of Georgian troops were 
brought in.  The Russian Foreign Ministry protested that latest “provocative” 
action by Georgia.  (4)  The Georgian Foreign Ministry, in response, claimed the 
Russians had sent armored vehicles to the scene, and that “the Georgian 
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peacekeeping battalion, which arrived at the scene of the car accident, acted 
absolutely legally.” (5)  Three officers sent from Moscow to settle the conflict 
were detained by Georgian police because they did not have visas to enter the 
country.  (6)   They were sent home with an OSCE escort.  Regardless of who 
was provoking whom, however, the more important thing to keep in mind is that 
tensions among the peacekeepers themselves – armed military troops – are 
escalating.  Meanwhile, Georgian air space was closed to Russian military 
transport planes for some time in January – “a purely economic decision” 
according to a source in the Georgian Civil Aviation Department.  (7) 
 
It has been clear that the Georgians hoped Western peacekeepers would either 
dilute, or replace, Russian troops, by stressing the Russians were not 
trustworthy.  Earlier statements that the “peacekeepers” clearly do not suffice (8) 
have segued into charges that Russia is now on the attack, holding Georgia 
hostage by withholding energy supplies.  Sometimes, the connection is clear, 
such as when Russia actually raised the price of energy (9); other charges that 
Moscow was behind a series of pipeline explosions (10) are less certain. 
 
While continuing its diatribes against the “evil empire,” Georgia has been steadily 
increasing military capacity.  Last month, the government called for an additional 
1,000 conscripts for the army. (11)  According to defense ministry officials, the 
number of troops in the Georgian military is expected to reach 31,878.  (12) 
 
It’s not just the “peacekeepers” in South Ossetia, either, who are targets for 
Georgian moves.  The Georgians want all Russians out, now.  After all, Russia 
has set – and then pushed forward into the future – repeated dates for 
evacuating its military personnel. About 25 Georgian military police tried to seize 
the Russian facilities of the 12th military base in Batumi on 20 January, according 
to Major-General Andrei Popov, the commander of the Russian Group of Forces 
in the Transcaucasus.  Intervention by the Russian military commanders and 
ambassador to Georgia and discussions with Georgian military and political 
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leaders ended the confrontation. (13) According to the Chief of Staff of the 
Russian Armed Forces, General Yui Baluyevsky, there is a timeline by which 
troops will be withdrawn – “before the end of 2008.” (14)  The military hardware 
from the Alkhalkalaki base in Georgia is due to be taken to the 102nd military 
base in 2006-07, Army General Aleksandr Baranov, the commander of the North 
Caucasian Military District, announced after a visit to the Armenian base by 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov. (15) 
 
But Tbilisi received the very clear signal last week that, while continuing to 
support the concept of Georgian territorial sovereignty, the West (read: the 
United States) does not want military conflict in the region.  However, in that 
signal may have continued another – Georgia may be moving in the right 
direction, just too quickly. 
 
US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), Julie Finley, said she and the OSCE recognize that the existing 
framework for resolving the conflict is ineffective.  She added, however, that “a 
request for the peacekeepers to leave without anything in their place may be 
destabilizing. In this regard, we call on Georgia to contribute its full complement 
of forces to maintain the proper balance within the JPKF.” (16) Hmmmm.  That 
sounds less like a death knell to Georgian aspirations of unifying the country than 
South Ossetia, and Russia, may have anticipated; indeed, it implies that 
sufficient Georgian troop strength in the conflict zone could keep the peace.  Still 
Finley’s statement also included the hope that the next JCC meeting will be more 
productive than the last had been – an acknowledgement of ineffectiveness 
coupled with the expectation that the JCC forum would continue to be used.  This 
is a setback for Georgian hopes to work outside the Commission.  The next 
meeting is scheduled for February 20 and 21. 
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Russia has reiterated that it has no choice but to “protect” South Ossetians, 
many of whom have been turned – following a widespread Russian campaign – 
into Russian citizens. (17)  
 
NKAO 
Still no agreement 
The removal of “peacekeepers” elsewhere in the Caucasus was under 
discussion in Paris over the weekend, but the presidents of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan could not reach any conclusive agreement on what was to be done 
with the Nagorno-Karabakh exclave.  (18)  According to Azerbaijan Foreign 
Minister Elmar Mamedyarov, only two of the nine issues under discussion – “the 
return of refugees and forced migrants and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan” – 
were sticking points. (19)  Unfortunately, of course, those are the key points to 
the conflict.  
 
Negotiations are scheduled to continue in March, but there is little political will 
evident to resolve the crisis conclusively and peacefully.  Indeed, prior to the 
meeting, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev assured the population that no 
concessions would be made.  “It is our land.  Historically, it belongs to 
Azerbaijan, and we should liberate it by any means necessary.  In order to do 
that, we have to become stronger, our army must be strengthened,” he said.  
(20) 
 
Never hesitant to insert itself into regional conflicts, Russia offered armed forces 
as “peacekeepers.”  But such a peace would be costly, since the Russians, 
according to Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, “are 
ready to arm both Armenia and Azerbaijan, though taking into account the 
balance of forces and our own national security.” (21)  Given that Azerbaijan 
already has increased its defense spending, and the Russian-Armenian alliance 
is well-documented, one must assume that such a statement means… arming 
Armenia, at below-market prices. 
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AZERBAIJAN 
Trust me, it’s good for you 
Just in case anyone in the Baku government was feeling comfortable enough to 
start decorating offices, here comes a cautionary tale.  The administration has, 
for the past three months, been a virtual revolving door for hirings and firings and 
reassignments.  
 
The latest batch of administrative shuffles occurred early in February.  Aliyev 
relieved Kamaladdin Heydarov of his position as chairman of the State Customs 
Committee, appointing him instead to head the newly-formed Ministry of 
Emergencies (a combination of Civil Defense, Fire Protection and the State 
Committee for Reserves).  Heydarov will be replaced at the State Customs 
Committee by the first deputy chairman of the committee, Aydin Aliyev.  (22) 
 
Within two days, businessman Fizuli Alekperov was named Labor and Social 
Security Minister (replacing the dismissed Minister Ali Nagiyev), and 
businessman Azad Ragimov was appointed Youth and Sports Minister.   The 
reshufflings are intended to streamline government and improve Azerbaijan’s 
image abroad, according to MP Ziyad Samedzade, who heads (at least for now) 
the parliamentary commission on economic policy.  (23) 
 
But the reshuffling has been going on a bit longer, since the October pre-election 
purge of ministers and high-ranking businessmen suspected of plotting a coup 
against the president.   Early personnel changes occurred shortly after last 
November’s parliamentary election, and originally centered on the energy sector.  
Most notably, on 9 December, Aliyev named Natiq Aliyev, the Director of the 
Azerbaijan State Petroleum Company (GNKAR), as Minister of Industry and 
Energy. Replacing Natiq Aliyev at GNKAR was Rovnaq Abdullayev.  Both men 
reportedly had connections with the president going back over 10 years; Ilham 
Aliyev was once Natiq Aliyev’s first deputy at GNKAR, while the president and 
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Abdullayev have purportedly known each other since their college days in 
Moscow.  (24) 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Government crackdown continues 
In September 2005, the trial of 15 "Islamic militants" accused of instigating the 
Andijan rebellion took place in Tashkent. Two months later, the court delivered its 
verdict, sentencing each of the defendants to prison terms ranging from 14 to 20 
years. (1) 
 
Some time before the trial began, the Uzbek government launched a massive 
campaign against the country's opposition forces, human rights activists and 
organizations (whether Uzbek or foreign), and international media outlets. The 
Uzbek government's actions were 'justified' retroactively by the Prosecutor's 
allegations that Western media organizations, specifically the BBC and Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, had provided substantial funding to the 'militants.' (2) 
 
The Uzbek government's campaign, unsurprisingly, has been successful. First, 
on 26 October, the BBC World Service announced that all of its correspondents 
would be withdrawn from the country, while its offices would close for the 
foreseeable future. A BBC statement claimed that its announcement was the 
direct result of a campaign of "harassment and intimidation" by the government. 
Several Uzbek employees of the BBC reportedly have been granted political 
asylum in the United Kingdom. (3) During the weeks either side of the BBC's 
departure, several other prominent organizations, including Internews, the 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and the Open Society Institute 
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also closed their offices and withdrew their correspondents, citing impossible 
working conditions. (4) 
 
On 12 December, the government refused to renew Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty's accreditation, forcing the closure of its Tashkent bureau. In a report 
published a day after the government's decision, RFE/RL claimed that a number 
of its reporters and their families had received direct telephone threats from the 
National Security Service, while others, their recording equipment seized, had 
been detained and beaten by authorities. (5) 
 
Last month, the Uzbek Justice Ministry issued an injunction against Freedom 
House, the US-sponsored NGO. Although the term was not used directly by the 
Ministry, the charges against the organization amounted to subversion. 
Specifically, the Ministry alleged that Freedom House had violated national laws 
on non-governmental organizations by providing gratis internet access to Uzbek 
citizens, and by hosting "unregistered organizations…human rights defenders 
and political parties." (6) On February 6, a civil court in Tashkent took less than 7 
minutes to reject an appeal to reverse the organization's six month suspension. 
 
Freedom House has announced that no local employees will be removed from its 
payroll, in the hopes that operations can re-commence once the organization's 
suspension is served. (7) The press release on the court's decision contains one 
extremely disturbing piece of information—namely that some 200 foreign and 
domestic organizations have been forced to shut down since the events in 
Andijan in May 2005. (8) At this point in time, seems unlikely that the Uzbek 
government will relent in its activities. This is a conclusion supported by the 
ongoing of the leadership personalities of a major national opposition group. 
 
On 22 October, the National Security Service arrested Sanjar Umarov, leader of 
Uzbekistan's opposition Sunshine Coalition. Prior to his detention, Umarov had 
issued repeated calls for President Islam Karimov to dissolve the government 
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and appoint "progressive officials." (9) Umarov's fate probably was sealed further 
by his fundraising trip to the United States last year, as well his statement that, 
should the Sunshine Coalition "win the people's trust," he would run against 
Karimov in next year's presidential elections. (10) 
 
Two months after Umarov's arrest, the Sunshine Coalition was targeted again. 
Nodira Khidoyatova, a "coordinator" for the opposition group, was arrested by the 
NSS on returning from a trip to Moscow. According to the Russian press, 
Khidoyatova was virulently critical of President Karimov's leadership, and 
specifically of his handling of the Andijan crackdown, during her stay. (11) She 
faces charges of a financial nature (including tax-evasion and money laundering), 
similar to those leveled against Umarov. 
 
The two trials began respectively on 25 and 30 January. Umarov's case was 
immediately adjourned until February 3 to allow defense attorneys more time to 
prepare their case. (12) A verdict was expected by 30 January in Khidoyatova's 
case. (13) As yet, no verdict has been announced in the latter's case, while 
Umarov's trial reopened—albeit closed to the press—as scheduled on 3 
February. (14) 
 
A spokeswoman for the Uzbek Prosecutor's office has been at pains to stress 
that "Sanjar Umarov and his criminal group," (a phrase clearly designed to 
include Khidoyatova) are being tried for activities which have "nothing to do with 
politics," but are purely "economic crimes." (15) Given Umarov's activities as 
described above, and his direct “election challenge” against Karimov, this 
statement clearly cannot be taken at face value.  It seems likely that Umarov and 
Khidoyatova face forced exile at best, and lengthy (potentially life-long) custodial 
sentences at worst. 
 
While Karimov consolidates move into Russian camp. 
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President Karimov's actions vis-á-vis the opposition, media and NGOs have not 
been carried out in isolation. The President concurrently has conducted a 
“diplomatic offensive,” designed to remove Uzbekistan from the "Western camp," 
placing it firmly in alliance with President Vladimir Putin's Russia. 
 
Late in November 2005, the United States government, responding to demands 
issued by Tashkent in July, removed the last of its forces from the K2 airbase 
near Tashkent. Eight days before the last US troops left, Uzbekistan signed a 
significant mutual defense treaty with Russia. Then, in late December, Karimov 
signed a formal declaration, removing Uzbekistan from the US-supported, 
GUUAM alliance. (16) 
 
In the last few weeks, President Karimov has taken three further steps to re-
position Uzbekistan. First, he traveled to St. Petersburg, where he took part in an 
open meeting of the Interstate Council of Heads of State of the Eurasian 
Economic Organization (EEO), during which Uzbekistan officially was admitted to 
the organization. The EEO's stated goals are the creation of a "free trade zone," 
a joint customs organization, and eventually, a common market. (17) Karimov 
and Putin used the occasion to sign a number of agreements providing for 
Russian involvement in Uzbekistan, including a $1.5 billion deal with Gazprom for 
an oil and gas extraction project. (18) Secondly, on 7 February, Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) General Secretary Nikolai Bordiuzha met 
with Karimov in Tashkent in order to discuss "urgent international and regional" 
issues, including terrorism and narcotics trafficking. (19) Although no mention of 
such a discussion was made by President Karimov's Press Service, a number of 
sources confirmed prior to the meeting that Uzbekistan's future accession to the 
CSTO would be on the agenda. (20) Finally, a report in Germany's Der Spiegel 
indicated that the German government has been notified that it may be asked to 
close the Bundeswehr base at Termez. (21) According to the Uzbek foreign 
ministry, Berlin violated the basing agreement in that Termez was used to ferry 
some 400 third party nationals from Afghanistan back to their home countries. 
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As a condition for the base remaining open, Tashkent apparently has demanded 
that the German government increase its local "assistance," including building a 
local hotel and hospital to the tune of 20 million Euros (22), above and beyond 
the infrastructure agreements reached in December. (23) German officials are 
due to travel to Uzbekistan in February to negotiate the issue, but should 
Tashkent hold firm, and should German troops be forced to leave, Tashkent's 
ties to the 'West' will be fully severed. 
 
KYRGYSTAN 
Presidential-Parliamentary battle brewing? 
During the last week, there have been indications that a serious power struggle 
between the Parliament and President Kurmanbek Bakiev may be on the 
horizon. On 3 February, Bakiev made a surprise appearance at Parliament in 
order to address deputies. Bakiev complained that Parliament had refused to 
confirm one out of every five bills sent for debate. (24) Bakiev's attack continued, 
with the President alleging that the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) had been 
"sabotaging" the privatization program and had tried to "assume the role of head 
of state." Bakiev's speech, which also contained admonishments that deputies 
were abusing their positions for personal gain brought a strong reaction. Jogorku 
Kenesh Speaker Omurbek Tekebaev claimed that Parliament had never 
exceeded its remit, while other MP's likened Bakiev's speech to "a Communist 
Party meeting on a Soviet-era collective farm." (25) 
 
In the week since Bakiev's remarks, the war of words has escalated. On 9 
February, Tekebaev addressed deputies, claiming that Bakiev's errors were 
"grave enough to make the man hang himself." (26) Immediately when making 
this speech, Tekebaev was forced to leave a meeting of the Security Council, 
after President Bakiev stated that he would not participate if Tekebaev remained 
in the room. (27) 
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The same day, the Kyrgyz Prosecutor General, Kambaraly Kongantiyev claimed 
that Tekebaev could face charges of defaming the Presidency, and that Bakiev 
could choose to dissolve Parliament as a result of the Speaker's words. (28) 
Tekebaev tendered his resignation on 10 February, (29) but his departure may 
not signal the end of this matter: Azimbek Beknazarov, a former Bakiev ally who 
served as interim Prosecutor General last year, has labeled Kongantiyev's 
remarks as "attacks on the Jogorku Kenesh," (30) adding that the issue would be 
debated in Parliament. As yet, no news of a debate or further action by the 
Prosecutor General has emerged. Given the already tenuous situation in 
Kyrgyzstan, it is to be hoped that a major confrontation between the executive 
and legislature can be avoided. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
When will there be real justice for Gongadze? 
On 16 September 2000, Ukrainian journalist Heorhiy Gongadze disappeared.  
Two months later, his decapitated body was discovered in a forest not far from 
Kyiv.  Just one month after that, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz released 
recordings on which then President Leonid Kuchma reportedly was heard 
ordering the journalist’s abduction.  The ensuing attempt by Ukraine’s authorities 
to deny their involvement in his death and the lack of any credible investigation of 
the case provided Ukraine’s political opposition with an anthem.  It sparked the 
country’s largest demonstrations since 1991 and pointed Ukraine on a path 
toward revolution. 
 
On 1 March 2005, after years of protests in Gongadze’s name and an orange 
revolution that embraced his cause, new President Viktor Yushchenko proudly 
announced that “the murder of Gongadze has been solved. … The former regime 
protected the assassins.” Now, he said, the country must “find out who ordered 
and organized” the killing. (1)  But today, over 5 years after Gongadze’s death, 
and almost one year after Yushchenko’s triumphant announcement, the 
organizers of the crime remain free, the trial of “the assassins” drags on with 
numerous postponements, and his family still waits for justice.  
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Trial inches forward, behind closed doors 
There has been some progress.  In August 2005, three former police colonels 
were arrested and charged with abducting and killing Gongadze.  Another 
suspect and the reported leader of the men, General Oleksiy Pukach, fled the 
country.   
 
Trail proceedings began against the three colonels on 19 December.  At that 
time, during a preliminary hearing, a Kyiv court decreed that substantive 
arguments would begin on 9 January “in public.” (2) 
 
On 9 January, however, the tenor of events changed.   “The journalists of the 
Ukrainian mass media who were going to cover the hearing on the murder of 
Heorhiy Gongadze … are demanding that a criminal case should be opened over 
the situation in which they were prevented from carrying out their professional 
duties,” reported Ukrainian television 5 Kanal.  “The guards who accompanied 
the suspects rudely pushed the journalists out of the courtroom, and several 
policemen resorted to rubber batons.”  (3) 
 
The trial then was quickly adjourned for two weeks after one of the defendants 
complained of “elevated blood pressure.”   
 
Not long after, in response to complaints from the defendants, the court altered 
its earlier ruling and said that all trial testimony would be closed to the public and 
media.  “Providing media with access to court sessions may produce negative 
consequences, [and] impede a comprehensive, full and unbiased investigation of 
the case,” presiding Judge Iryna Hryhoryeva announced.   (4)  The State 
Prosecutor’s Office supported the ruling, suddenly suggesting that certain 
evidence dealt with state secrets.  “There are certain secret documents and 
individuals who cannot be questioned in public,” Prosecutor General Oleksandr 
Medvedko said. (5) 
 46 
 
However, representatives of the family disputed this statement, saying that they 
had clearly been informed by the prosecutor when examining the case file that it 
did not contain anything categorized as a state secret. 
 
What about the organizers? 
The court’s newfound hesitance to allow media access to the trial developed on 
what would have been the first day of testimony; before the trial opened, 
Gongadze’s widow Myroslava and a representative of his mother Lesya gave 
strong statements demanding that not only the direct murderers, but also the 
organizers of the crime be put on trial. 
 
They also declared publicly their intention to make full use of a provision in 
Ukrainian law that allows family members of victims to request that the presiding 
judge call witnesses – witnesses who may or may not be called by the 
prosecutor.   
 
“I don’t think this [trial] is enough,” Myroslava Gongadze said, “because these 
people had no personal motives for killing Heorhiy.  They were carrying out a 
criminal order.”  While the defendants, she said, must answer for their crimes, 
since they did not refuse to carry out their order,  “the next step will be when the 
organizers of this crime are brought to justice.  Their identities are known and 
they must be punished,” she said, referring to the “Gongadze tapes” released by 
Moroz in 2000.  (6)  
 
On these tapes, which have been authenticated by several laboratories around 
the world (including the FBI), a voice said to be Kuchma’s repeatedly asks for an 
update on “what to do” about Gongadze, and several times urges that he be 
kidnapped and “thrown to the Chechens.”  Former Interior Minister Yuriy 
Kravchenko responds that his “team” will “do everything you want.”  (Not 
incidentally, Kravchenko was reported by authorities to have committed suicide 
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by shooting himself twice in the head the day after Yushchenko’s announcement 
that the case was solved.)  (7) 
 
However, in spite of this evidence, there has been little attempt to question 
Kuchma about this crime.  Myroslava Gongadze suggests that perhaps the 
resolve to bring the organizers to justice does not exist.  “It looks like there is still 
no political will to hold responsible those who ordered the killing,” she said.  (8) 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in an 8 November 2005 decision on the 
case of Myroslava Gongadze vs. Ukraine, seemed to support this statement.  
The decision found that, until December 2004, the authorities had violated the 
European Convention of Human Rights by failing to investigate the case 
adequately, causing undue suffering and denying effective remedy for the crime.  
 
However, the European Court also took note of the lack of response in 2005 to a 
detailed Ukrainian parliamentary investigation on the case “which concluded that 
the kidnap and murder of Mr Gongadze had been organised by former President 
Kuchma and Mr Kravchenko and that the current speaker of Parliament, Mr V. 
Lytvyn, and a member of parliament, Mr L. Derkach, were involved in the 
crimes.”  The report notes that the parliamentary report was transferred to the 
Prosecutor General’s Office in September 2005, but no action was taken by that 
office.  
 
The conduct of the trial would seem to support these concerns, as prosecutors 
appear to use every tool to limit the scope of the inquiry only to the three men.  
Since 9 January, no substantive testimony has been given.  At least three times 
the hearing has been adjourned because of an expressed “illness” of a 
defendant, and adjournments have generally lasted at least one week.  
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This has led Myroslava Gongadze to suggest that an attempt is perhaps being 
made to postpone testimony until after the 26 March parliamentary election in 
order to protect those whom she and Lesya Gongadze will call as witnesses.  
 
“We intend to invite many witnesses who will be able to shed a lot of light on this 
case,” she said on 9 January.  (9)  Later, she emphasized that “a number of the 
witnesses are members of election lists.”  Therefore, after 26 March, most of 
these individuals will have either extended or received new parliamentary 
immunity.  (10) 
 
Clearly, the murder itself and the ensuing five year “cover-up” has touched a 
number of major Ukrainian politicians in some way. 
 
Lesya Gongadze has already officially requested that Kuchma, Parliamentary 
Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn (heard on the tape encouraging Kuchma to have 
Kravchenko “handle” Gongadze), former Security Service Head Leonid Derkach, 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Vasyl Malyarenko and President Viktor 
Yushchenko testify.  (11)  Although her attorney makes it clear that he in no way 
believes Yushchenko is involved in the Gongadze case itself, it is likely that 
Andriy Fedur would like to ask Yushchenko about a reported agreement on 
immunity with Kuchma regarding this crime.   
 
Judge Iryna Hryhoryeva has so far refused Lesya Gongadze’s requests for 
witnesses, but promised to reconsider them later.  Myroslava Gongadze, 
meanwhile, believes that the judge will have to allow at least some of the 
witnesses. 
 
Full circle? 
On 25 January, two of the three defendants pled guilty to all charges against 
them. There is little concern, based on the evidence seen by the family, that 
these confessions were forced.    Under Ukrainian law, the trial will continue in 
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order to determine appropriate sentences and to determine the guilt or innocence 
of the third defendant (who pled guilty to several lesser charges). 
 
But although three out of four of the direct killers of Heorhiy Gongadze now will 
likely spend the rest of their lives in prison, is this the justice that Ukrainians have 
fought for since 2000?   
 
The EU”s Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which has 
been one of the most vocal international organizations on the issue throughout 
the years, doesn’t think so.  PACE’s questioning of the investigation in October – 
after its initial welcoming of President Yushchenko’s rhetoric – must have been a 
painful point for a government courting Europe.  “Five years after the 
disappearance and murder of the journalist Gongadze,” PACE wrote in its 5 
October resolution, “the Assembly is dissatisfied that after the indictment in 
March 2005 of the alleged direct perpetrators of the murder, the investigation of 
the case has been stalled, in particular as regards the prosecution of those who 
ordered and organised this crime.”  The resolution notes prosecutorial action 
which “is seen as a step towards excluding from the prosecution the 
masterminds and organizers.” (12) 
 
If PACE’s representatives hoped that their resolution would alter the course of 
the investigation, they are no doubt disappointed, as are many Ukrainians who 
stood on Independence Square in November of 2004.  
 
Throughout the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians loudly demanded –  “Bandits to 
jail” and “Murderers to jail” – and it’s clear they weren’t talking about three police 
colonels. But in February of 2006, despite increased press freedom, and despite 
greater government transparency, the Gongadze case is, in many ways, where it 
was in 2004.   
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The organizers of the murder are technically unknown, yet the names are 
discussed by everyone involved in the case.  Those who directly committed the 
crime will go to prison, but likely without being made to shed any light on their 
actions.   The organizers of the crime continue enjoying their lives, seemingly 
secure in their freedom.   The president of the country repeatedly speaks of 
justice, but does little to ensure that it will occur in this particular case.  And the 
family of Gongadze is left isolated, wondering why, after five years and a 
revolution, they still cannot find justice for Heorhiy. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Moldova’s two-track development:  Foreign and Domestic policies follow 
different paths 
Over the last several years, Moldova President Vladimir Voronin has won 
international praise for his attempts to steer his country’s foreign policy toward 
Western international structures. Moldova has entered the WTO, expressed its 
desire to join the EU, adjusted many of its customs and tariff laws in the direction 
of European standards, refused to further integrate into the Russia-dominated 
Commonwealth of Independence States, welcomed an EU border-monitoring 
mission, and invited EU and U.S. representatives to participate in the stalled talks 
over the status of the Transnistria region.  
 
At the same time, however, President Voronin’s domestic policies have resulted, 
at a minimum, in a continuation of Soviet-style political practices, and at worst, a 
rolling-back of some of the gains made in the 1990s.  The press is stifled, political 
competition is limited and civic oversight of political decisions is almost non-
existent.  There is no better example of these tendencies than the plight of 
already-imprisoned former Defense Minister Valeriu Pasat.  The former minister 
and current external relations advisor to Russia’s Unified Energy Systems (UES), 
has worked consistently in opposition to President Voronin while maintaining a 
close relationship to UES head Anatoly Chubais.  Pasat now appears to be 
paying the price. 
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On 7 February, Moldovan prosecutors accused Pasat of attempting to overthrow 
the government and plotting to kill Iurie Rosca, leader of the pseudo-opposition 
Popular Christian Democratic Party.  
 
In a convoluted indictment, authorities suggest that Pasat approached Rosca a 
year ago with an offer of assistance for his party in the run-up to the 6 March 
2005 parliamentary election, and offered to support a violent overthrow of the 
government in the event that his party did not win the election.  This assistance 
reportedly would be both financial and logistical.  
 
Rosca, in a statement to the media, vigorously supported the charges.  “Pasat 
told me he was looking to remove Vladimir Voronin from power,” he said, and 
“proposed to finance the electoral campaign of the PPCD.”  Additionally, “If the 
Communist Party [headed by Voronin] won, it was planned to organize large-
scale street rallies to dispute the results of the election and to stage a so-called 
orange revolution in imitation of the events in Tbilisi and Kyiv.  The PPCD was 
given the role of organizer of the rallies.”  (13) 
 
Prosecutors and Rosca also suggested that, if these scenarios failed to remove 
Voronin, the PPCD leader was to be killed and, according to Rosca, “it should 
have led to turmoil for which President Vladimir Voronin was to be blamed.” (14)  
 
Despite, or perhaps partly because of, Rosca’s statements, numerous questions 
surround these charges.  This is particularly true when examined in light of 
previous charges against Pasat and within the context of Moldova’s oppressive 
political environment. 
 
Pasat was first arrested in March 2005 on charges of abusing his position while 
defense minister by selling 21 MiG 29 fighter jets to the United States for $40 
million.  Authorities accused Pasat of selling the fighters too cheaply, “inflicting 
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great damage” to the country.  The arrest came less than two weeks after the 
aforementioned parliamentary elections – during which Pasat reportedly worked 
closely with the opposition Democratic Moldova Bloc.  This Bloc ran separately 
from the PPCD.   
 
Less than one month ago, in a trial widely condemned by international human 
rights groups, a Moldovan court convicted Pasat for this “crime” and sentenced 
him to 10 years in prison.  
 
During the trial, former Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi testified on Pasat’s 
behalf, noting that he, not his defense minister, had given final approval of the 
price paid by the U.S. for the MiGs.  Additionally, E. Wayne Merry, former U.S. 
Defense Department regional director for Eurasia, and one of the chief 
negotiators for the deal, submitted a deposition on Pasat’s behalf.  
 
In a letter to the Financial Times, Merry called Pasat “a stubborn and difficult 
interlocutor, who prolonged the bargaining for months to gain more 
compensation for his country.”  He further called the deal “an entirely fair one for 
both sides,” and dismissed the so-called additional $55 million that Moldovan 
officials claim Pasat could have earned from an unnamed third party as “phantom 
money.”  “In fact,” he said, “many within the U.S. government believed we 
overpaid for the aging aircraft.”  (15)  
 
Speaking during a briefing for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Merry said that 
his deposition and willingness to give further information were ignored.  He 
suggested that former U.S. Ambassador John Todd Stewart’s deposition in 
support of Pasat’s position also was not taken into consideration. (16)  
 
This may not be the case in the European Court of Human Rights, where Pasat 
has said he will take his case.  As pointed out by Merry, “Mr. Pasat may find 
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justice from the European Court of Human Rights, which would at least consider 
the publicly available evidence.”  (17)  
 
Pasat has denied the new claims as vigorously as the previous charges.  “Rosca 
is desperate and he is going to great lengths in a bid to doctor his political image, 
which was greatly harmed … when his party voted for the re-election of President 
Vladimir Voronin.”  (18) 
 
In private, U.S. officials who have worked with both Pasat and Rosca express 
strong misgivings about the current claims, and suggest that this may be 
intended as “insurance” for the Moldovan government given the likelihood of 
Pasat’s success in the European Court of Human Rights.  While Moldova could 
ignore any European Court ruling, its EU aspirations and need for support 
against Russia’s pressure would make that a difficult position.  
 
Officials may hope that these new charges provide a better pretext for removing 
Pasat from the political scene – or even more, for providing an example to future 
politicians who choose to work either against Voronin or with Russian interests.  
What they may find, however, is that these charges have simply underscored the 
growing concerns about Moldova’s deteriorating domestic policies at a time when 
Moldova desperately needs Western support. 
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